San
Antonio, TX, Oct. 8, 2024
/PRNewswire/ -- Biglari Capital Corp. today issued the following
letter to shareholders of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
(NASDAQ: CBRL). See below for the shareholder letter in
its original form.
Dear Shareholders of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc.:
Through affiliated entities, we have been shareholders of
Cracker Barrel since 2011. We currently own 2,069,141 shares. Since
2019, the shareholders of Cracker Barrel have
collectively lost over $2.9
billion in market value.1 As 9.3% owners of the
stock, we have lost our proportional share.
Neither the appointment of Julie Felss
Masino as the Company's CEO nor her new transformation plan
has restored shareholder confidence. In fact, Cracker Barrel's
share price fell 14.5% when the transformation plan was revealed on
May 16, 2024, and is down 50.9% since
Ms. Masino became CEO-elect on August 7,
2023.2
This letter is devoted not only to the current plans of the
Company but also to the historical decisions that led to Cracker
Barrel's current crisis. A postmortem is instructive so as not to
repeat past mistakes. Nothing captures this sentiment better than
the cautionary words of George
Santayana: "Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it."
The Cracker Barrel Board Has Destroyed Shareholder
Value
Cracker Barrel is in perilous times. Not only is a change to its
Board warranted but we believe it is also mandatory for the sake of
the Company's future. The proof is in the stock performance — in
absolute terms and relative to its peers — over one-, three-, and
five-year time periods.
Total Shareholder
Returns
|
|
|
|
|
1-Year
|
3-Year
|
5-Year
|
Cracker
Barrel
|
(49.6 %)
|
(65.3 %)
|
(70.2 %)
|
Proxy Peer
Group
|
(11.6 %)
|
(10.6 %)
|
17.6 %
|
Casual Dining Peer
Group
|
(10.6 %)
|
(10.6 %)
|
12.4 %
|
S&P 500
Index
|
28.0 %
|
29.9 %
|
108.5 %
|
Source: FactSet.
Total shareholder returns as of August 16, 2024 — one day
before Biglari Capital Corp.'s nomination notice became public.
Cracker Barrel 2024
proxy peers include: Big Lots, Inc., Bloomin'
Brands, Inc., Brinker International, Inc., Cheesecake Factory
Incorporated, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Darden Restaurants,
Inc., Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc., Denny's Corporation,
Dine Brands Global, Inc., Domino's Pizza, Inc., Jack in the Box
Inc., Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., Texas Roadhouse, Inc.,
Tractor Supply Company, Wendy's Company, Williams-Sonoma,
Inc.
Casual dining
peers include: BJ's Restaurants, Inc., Bloomin' Brands,
Inc., Brinker International, Inc., Cheesecake Factory Incorporated,
Darden Restaurants, Inc., Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.,
Denny's Corporation, Dine Brands Global, Inc., Texas Roadhouse,
Inc.
|
Cracker Barrel's Poor Performance Is a Direct Result of Board
and Management Failures
Former CEO Sandy Cochran's tenure
was calamitous, but it is the Board that must be held to account
for approving capital expenditures for new stores and new brands,
from start-up Holler & Dash to the bar concept Punch Bowl
Social to Maple Street Biscuit. Despite glaring managerial failures
in new stores and a zero-for-three record on new brands, the Board
kept Ms. Cochran on in her CEO post — and for far too long. Then,
instead of firing Ms. Cochran after she failed to lead the Company
successfully as CEO, the Board invited her to lead the Board as
Chairman.
In most situations, promoting the retired CEO to Chairman and
having her look over the shoulder of the new CEO is an indication
of a breakdown in governance structure. Clearly, the Board was
deferential to
Ms. Cochran. Then Chairman Mr. William
McCarten stated at the time, "Sandy and the rest of the
Board have spent years planning for Sandy's succession and we are
happy to see that work pay off today. Sandy's contributions
to Cracker Barrel are too many to catalogue — from
driving performance and creating shareholder value, to recruiting
and mentoring key talent, to successfully guiding our company…. She
will add to that track record in her role as Executive Chair…."
After years of value destruction owing to mismanagement, the
collective Board bears full responsibility for the Company's poor
operating performance, poor capital allocation record, and poor
shareholder returns.
Cracker Barrel
Capital Allocation Record
|
($ in
thousands)
|
|
2011
|
|
2023
|
|
Change
|
Revenues
|
$ 2,434,435
|
$ 3,442,808
|
|
$ 1,008,373
|
Operating
Income
|
$
167,181
|
|
$
120,617
|
|
$
(46,564)
|
Number of
Cracker Barrel
Stores
|
603
|
|
660
|
|
57
|
Cumulative Capital
Expenditures (12-Year Period):
|
|
|
|
|
$
1,447,060
|
Source: As reported
in SEC filings. Capital expenditures are from fiscal years 2012
through 2023, which cover Ms. Cochran's tenure as
CEO.
|
Over a 12-year period, cumulative capital expenditures
totaled $1.4 billion, yet annual
operating income fell from $167
million in fiscal 2011 to $121
million in fiscal 2023. Every acquisition under the Board's
watch destroyed value. Capital expenditures approved by the Board
have increased overall sales, but operating profit has
declined. As a result, the stock price is lower today than
it was in fiscal 2011.
Despite the changes to the Board and management, earnings of
fiscal 2024 were lower than those of fiscal 2023. Sales are too
weak, costs are too high, and margins are too low. Moreover,
Cracker Barrel has no credible plan to regain customer traffic. In
fact, management has forecast a decline in traffic for the fiscal
year 2025. Meanwhile, the Board's decision to slash the quarterly
dividend by about 80% highlights the steep burden shareholders must
bear for management's new plan.
Let it be known that we warned the Board and shareholders of
what we saw as it unfolded — the lack of focus on core operations,
the low returns on new stores, and the attempt to launch or
purchase nonsensical brands — through a total of 12 shareholders'
letters since 2011; they can be accessed at
enhancecrackerbarrel.com. We could not have been more vocal about
the Board's missteps. Had we not repeatedly run several proxy
contests, we believe Cracker Barrel would have opened hundreds of
new stores instead of returning that capital to shareholders. But
because we did not prevail in prior proxy contests, the Company
continued to venture outside its lane while failing in the
execution of its core business. Unfortunately, the chickens have
come home to roost.
We value focused management and focused companies. As investors,
we have seen focused management excel and have seen time and again
what happens when management loses focus: failure ensues. The
difference is billions of dollars' worth of market value.
Here are two areas where the Board could have rejected obvious
folly:
- New stores. Opening new stores was unnecessary and
costly. When customer traffic is declining in existing stores,
a savvy operator doesn't try to make up for it by opening new
locations. And to compound the situation, expanding the Company's
footprint on the highly expensive West Coast was an unforced error.
Returns on new stores were destined to be poor — the cost to build
was too high, as was the volume required to succeed. To put the
numbers into perspective, in the first 40 years of Cracker Barrel's
existence, there were about 20 closures,3 but in the
last two years, 10 Cracker Barrel stores have closed, mainly on the
West Coast. In other words, about 3% of stores closed in the
Company's first four decades of operation but nearly 60% of stores
in the West Coast expansion closed in the last several years,
underscoring the current Board's fundamentally flawed
decision-making. Of course, we vehemently opposed new store
investments, and history proves that we were correct.
- New brands. Holler & Dash and Punch Bowl Social were
both terminal investments. The first was the wrong formulation for
a company that had no executive on its team who had successfully
started a new company. The second was a risky proposition because
in the bars and taverns business, as anyone who has ventured there
knows, an especially steep climb awaits anyone aspiring to success.
The losses were material: Punch Bowl Social alone cost the Company
about $140 million, or about 14% of
the current market capitalization. Why would a family dining
establishment venture into these urban-centric concepts in the
first place?
A Flawed Board Is Responsible for a Flawed Strategy
On May 16, 2024, management
discussed its "strategic transformation plan," a
high-capital-expenditure strategy. Over the next three years, the
Company plans to spend "$600 million
to $700 million" in capital expenditures, which represents
about 70% of Cracker Barrel's market capitalization.
The plan the Board has adopted involves remodeling the units
with new booths and banquettes, which have not been part of store
interiors to date. Yet the problem lies not in the seating but in
getting more people to sit in it. We do not believe changing the
furniture and altering the decor are going to change the Company's
trajectory or solve the Company's underlying problem of declining
traffic.
We believe the questionable transformation plan is indicative of
a poorly constituted board that cannot relate to the Cracker Barrel
brand or its customers. It lacks turnaround experience, and is
critically missing the skill set needed to address the underlying
business challenges.
While announcing the transformation plan, CEO Julie Masino stated: "[W]e're just not as
relevant as we once were." We question how and when Cracker Barrel
ostensibly lost relevance. If it has, where was the Board during
this period of slow and steady decline?
Can Cracker Barrel spend its way back to relevance? Investors
think not. From the moment management presented its plan on
May 16, 2024, through the date of our
nomination, the stock price fell another 29.2%, compared with a
gain of 5.2% in the S&P 500.4 Because the past
capital investment record of Cracker Barrel has been disastrous by
any measure, how can we rely on the current Board to properly
address the wisdom of its plan for massive investment? With the
passage of time, all of our concerns over prior growth capital
expenditures were borne out.
The Right Plan for Cracker Barrel: Focus on the Core
Business
Contrary to the recent pronouncements by management, we believe
Cracker Barrel is relevant; the problem rests not with the brand
but with its board.
Cracker Barrel has been geographically well positioned all
along. About half of the 658 Cracker Barrel stores are situated in
the fastest-growing states by population over the last year:
Texas, Florida, North
Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Georgia.5 Cracker Barrel has
premier real estate, with 83% of it located along interstate
highways.
It is therefore shocking and inexcusable that the Company has
lost about a third of its customer traffic over the last 20 years,
despite operating in areas of the country with population growth,
robust economic growth, and a huge advantage in real estate.
Instead of implementing the high-capex plan, we believe the
Board should focus on the following low-capex plan:
- Divest Maple Street Biscuit. Management can't
effectively execute a turnaround while spending time on a rounding
error. We believe Maple Street is an
unnecessary extracurricular distraction for the Board and
management. Andy Grove wrote, "The
art of management lies in the capacity to select from the
many activities of seemingly comparable significance the one or two
or three that provide leverage well beyond the others and
concentrate on them."
- Halt new store openings. Every time a new unit opens, it
costs about $8 million. The view has
to be that all capital is precious. An entire team to support new
unit growth is costing the Company, by our estimation, millions of
dollars in general and administrative expenses annually. Yet the
value and opportunity lie in existing units.
- Focus on store-level economics. The single greatest way
for Cracker Barrel to create value is by improving operations. The
stores must provide a warm, caring, hospitable environment with
authentic country cooking. The principal reason unit-level
performance has been dismal is that unit-level customer traffic has
been declining. Regaining the lost traffic in existing stores holds
the potential of several billion dollars in market value creation.
Realizing this potential will entail, among other things, improving
the quality of products and service, and making more effective use
of technology. What the Company has been doing with its remodel
program is embarking on a strategy to undifferentiate itself
— and at a high cost — while making wholesale changes such as
introducing "20 new items." Instead, we believe the Company has to
keep its offerings simple but true to the brand's heritage, in the
form of high-quality home-style cooking. It should not be all
things to all people, but known for offerings that are
differentiated in an old-fashioned way whose consistent ingredient
is quality.
- Return cash to claimholders. Pay down debt and pay
dividends. Our low-capex plan to improve operations, attain
peer-comparable store-level margins, and eliminate excess general
and administrative expenses will allow for the restoration of
higher dividend payments or share buybacks.
Cracker Barrel's leadership should put all of its attention on
providing great products and great service at a great value. It
will never be one thing that solves the Company's problems but a
lot of important little
things — details that stem from ingenuity, not capital.
The Board Is in Urgent Need of Change
There is one area where the Board has been consistent, and that
is in the inventiveness of its range of excuses over the years,
blaming its woes on everything from high gas prices to tough
demographics to the coronavirus to brand relevancy. The truth is
that none of the aforementioned elements are to blame for the
Company's performance. The stock has lost over 70% of its value in
the last five years not because of external factors but because of
internal failures. Plainly, when management cuts the quality of
products and service while raising prices year after year, the
blame rests with leadership, not the brand.
The Cracker Barrel board has a history of periodically reporting
on the lessons it has learned from its latest disappointment. The
problem is that the Board keeps seeking out future lessons. The
Board has been given a pass for far too long. Shareholders should
not allow such folly to continue.
We had hoped to avoid another public contest, desiring to settle
with the Board privately. After the dismal failures and billions of
dollars in shareholder value lost, we had expected the Board to be
more receptive to an amicable resolution. But they seem insistent
on keeping us off the Board despite the fact that we have been
right all along on the major issues we have raised. Clearly, the
Board is being emotionally reactive by steadfastly refusing to
collaborate with one of the Company's largest, long-term
shareholders. I not only have the qualifications of industry- and
company-specific knowledge but also the situational experience of
turning around a family dining establishment. It is for this reason
that my candidacy is critical. Their resistance toward us is,
unfortunately, a pattern that has cost all shareholders. Moreover,
the Board is engaging in gamesmanship, making superficial
settlement offers that sidestep the need for substantive change.
However, such tactics are why we now find ourselves in an untenable
situation, which, if it continues, will, in our view, take the
Company down the same path as the likes of Red Lobster and Ruby
Tuesday — two chains that ended up in bankruptcy court.
Cracker Barrel is not in dire need of a transformation; it's in
dire need of a turnaround. We have invested in an array of
restaurant companies for 20 years and have been operating
restaurant chains for nearly as long. I have hired past executives
of Cracker Barrel, met with its late founder, and visited hundreds
of Cracker Barrel stores over the decades. I am confident that we
have a greater institutional knowledge of the Cracker Barrel brand
than any current board member.
We have faced brand relevancy issues and have managed to fix a
brand in the family dining segment with an older demographic. That
is to say, we have exactly what the Cracker Barrel board needs to
assess store cannibalization; diagnose customer traffic decline;
identify general and administrative excess; analyze capital
expenditure returns, including the proposed remodel program; and
evaluate brand positioning. There is also nothing like the
engagement of board members who have skin in the game. We not only
have expertise but also a significant stake in the Company — one we
have held for a long time.
The dysfunction of the Board has become institutionalized under
the auspices of a "refreshed" Board. Cracker Barrel now faces the
exigency of a turnaround situation. But who on the Board has ever
dealt successfully with a turnaround in the family dining segment
of the industry? I have no doubt we shareholders will all continue
to lose if we follow the same old approach of adding board members
who, despite their strong general resumes, are wrong for Cracker
Barrel. The self-proclaimed refreshment program has led
shareholders to the grave realization that the Company's peer group
outperforms the Company on all relevant metrics. Now is the
time for change. Now is the time for accountability.
Cracker Barrel is not a broken brand but it has a broken board.
The strategy of a refreshed board has been given its chance for 13
years. We now ask you to give one of Cracker Barrel's largest and
most
long-standing shareholders an opportunity to advocate for all
shareholders through our nominees. Indeed, upon filing our
preliminary proxy statement on September 23,
2024, which laid out our concerns and ideas, the market
reacted favorably, giving Cracker Barrel a one-day stock gain of
5.9% while the Company's casual dining peer group declined by
0.8%.
We are seeking positions on the Board to bring diversity of
thought to the boardroom in an effort to help address the
Company's challenges, restore prosperity, and create value for
shareholders. To be sure, it is exactly at such a concerning moment
that the Company's problems could be compounded by new poor
decisions that ultimately lead to the demise of a once venerable
brand. No shareholder can afford to give the Board any more
chances.
Sincerely,
/s/ Sardar
Biglari
Sardar
Biglari
CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
PARTICIPANTS
Biglari Capital Corp., together with the other participants
named below (collectively, "Biglari"), has filed a preliminary
proxy statement and accompanying GOLD universal proxy card with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to be used to solicit
votes for the election of its director nominees at the 2024 annual
meeting of shareholders of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.,
a Tennessee corporation (the
"Company").
BIGLARI STRONGLY ADVISES ALL SHAREHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ
THE PROXY STATEMENT AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS AS THEY BECOME
AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. SUCH
PROXY MATERIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE SEC'S WEB
SITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV. IN ADDITION, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS
PROXY SOLICITATION WILL PROVIDE COPIES OF THE PROXY STATEMENT
WITHOUT CHARGE, WHEN AVAILABLE, UPON REQUEST. REQUESTS FOR COPIES
SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE PARTICIPANTS' PROXY SOLICITOR.
The participants in the proxy solicitation are anticipated to be
Biglari Capital Corp. ("Biglari Capital"), The Lion Fund II, L.P.
(the "Lion Fund II"), First Guard Insurance Company ("First
Guard"), Southern Pioneer Property and Casualty Insurance Company
("Southern Pioneer"), Biglari Reinsurance Ltd. ("Biglari
Reinsurance"), Biglari Insurance Group Inc. ("Biglari Insurance"),
Biglari Holdings Inc. ("Biglari Holdings"), Sardar Biglari, Milena
Alberti-Perez and Michael
Goodwin.
As of the date hereof, the participants in the proxy
solicitation beneficially own in the aggregate 2,069,141 shares of
Common Stock, par value $0.01 per
share, of the Company (the "Common Stock"). As of the date hereof,
the Lion Fund II is the direct beneficial owner of 2,000,000 shares
of Common Stock. Biglari Capital, as the general partner of the
Lion Fund II, may be deemed to beneficially own the 2,000,000
shares of Common Stock owned by the Lion Fund II. As of the date
hereof, First Guard is the direct beneficial owner of 62,300 shares
of Common Stock. As of the date hereof, Southern Pioneer is the
direct beneficial owner of 6,841 shares of Common Stock. Biglari
Reinsurance, as the direct parent company of each of First Guard
and Southern Pioneer, may be deemed to beneficially own the 69,141
shares of Common Stock owned in the aggregate by First Guard and
Southern Pioneer. Biglari Insurance, as the direct parent company
of Biglari Reinsurance, may be deemed to beneficially own the
69,141 shares of Common Stock owned in the aggregate by First Guard
and Southern Pioneer. Biglari Holdings, as the direct parent
company of Biglari Insurance, may be deemed to beneficially own the
69,141 shares of Common Stock owned in the aggregate by First Guard
and Southern Pioneer. Mr. Biglari, as the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of each of Biglari Capital and Biglari Holdings,
may be deemed to beneficially own the 2,069,141 shares of Common
Stock owned in the aggregate by the Lion Fund II, First Guard and
Southern Pioneer. As of the date hereof, neither Ms. Alberti-Perez
nor Mr. Goodwin owns beneficially or of record any shares of Common
Stock.
1 Source: FactSet. Based on Cracker Barrel's market
value of $3.84 billion on
January 1, 2019, and market value of
$985.9 million on October 7, 2024.
2
https://investor.crackerbarrel.com/news-releases/news-release-details/cracker-barrel-names-julie-felss-masino-companys-new-president
3 Source: Transcript of Sandra
Cochran, former CEO, at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Consumer and Retail Conference, March
2015.
4 Source: FactSet.
5 https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-trends-return-to-pre-pandemic-norms.html
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SOURCE Biglari Capital Corp.