DCBill
3 hours ago
ROLG's blog today about Bessent and Ackman.
Commentary on the Ackman/Bessent Doubleheader
And a Word of Caution Regarding Recent GSE Common Stock Trading Pattern
Rule Of Law Guy
Jan 16
·
Today, Bill Ackman presented his slide deck with commentary on Pershing’s valuation of FNMA and FMCC, pro forma for the recap/release expected during Trump 47. You can find the presentation here.
As well, Treasury Secretary nominee Scott Bessent fielded questioning from the Senate Finance Committee en route to an expected confirmation recommendation to the Senate (and confirmation by the full Senate). His hearing can be found here.
Please find below my commentary on these two important events for GSE investors. This commentary will appear for paying subscribers. I encourage all of my free subscribers to upgrade to paid to support my newsletter.
Freedom from the paywall costs only a cup of coffee per month! My newsletter is good to the last drop.
Bessent
I will start with the Bessent Treasury Secretary nominee Senate Finance Committee confirmation hearing, and I can be brief. The topics of the GSEs, and their recapitalization and conservatorship release did not come up at all in the three and one half hour hearing.
It seems that Senators who once harbored antagonistic views regarding GSE recap/release, such as Senator Warner, have GSE fatigue. Senator Warren, new to the Committee who one would expect is antagonistic to GSE administrative reform, likewise had nothing to say on the GSEs.
This is unalloyed good news for GSE investors. Senators are fixated currently on Trumpian tariffs and taxes in respect of Treasury matters, and I suspect this will continue until such time as the Trump 47 administration formally announces an administrative GSE recap/release program. At that time, some Senators may summon up their righteous indignation and bloviate, a dollar short and a day late. For Democrat Senators so eager to increase federal government revenues (through higher taxes on the wealthy), the reply that the GSE recap/release will increase federal government revenues substantially is a hard response to parry.
Notwithstanding this Senate Finance Committee silence on the GSEs, can we glean from this hearing anything regarding whether Treasury Secretary Bessent will be in favor of cancelling the SPS owned by Treasury in the recap/release, given that Treasury has received repayment of an amount greater than 10% IRR (the contracted 10% return on senior preferred principal, together with full repayment of that principal) from the GSEs? Of course, this is a crucial detail for GSE common stock investors, including Ackman, who in his presentation (discussed below) makes this assumption.
Bessent came across in the hearing as a highly intelligent, highly experienced financial expert with a respectful, patient and courteous demeanor. He often said during the hearing that he will study matters in detail and pursue POTUS’s policies at all times. GSE recap/release is a Trump 47 policy, and I see no reason to believe that Bessent will go squishy on GSE recap/release like Treasury Secretary Mnuchin did in Trump 45.
As for eliminating the SPS as already repaid, I can only point to one of Bessent’s comments that made me think he might eliminate the SPS. Bessent stated in response to one request for a commitment from a Democrat Senator, “No data, no opinion.”
The facts matter to Bessent, more so than political advantage. I would expect a financial expert such as Bessent would fixate on the details of the net worth sweep and the fact that Treasury has already received its contracted for SPS IRR, while there is substantial additional financial return for Treasury to recoup through its 79.9% warrant GSE position (which Ackman forecasts to be over $300 million dollars).
I don’t see Bessent seeking additional common stock from conversion of the SPS.
Ackman
Bill Ackman and his Pershing team presented a detailed historical overview of the GSE saga that is worth listening to for those relatively new to the investment. In addition, his recap/release transaction and valuation details were also well thought out and detailed. He arrives at a substantially higher FNMA valuation pro forma for the recap/release than I did when I presented my analysis in a newsletter post.
The principal reasons for this is that I assume the ERCF will stay in place, resulting in greater common stock dilution, and I assume both a lower PE and higher Treasury overhang market discount than Ackman does.
I set forth his principal terms and assumptions below (where relevant to the GSE common stock, I focus only on FNMA).
Headline conclusions:
FNMA valuation of $31.81/sh (p. 88) as of 2026 year end, after a $5B IPO (p. 83).
To substantiate his expected price appreciation in FNMA, Ackman presented his investment experience with GGP (p. 91) as precedent. Ackman states that GGP was his best investment to date in a stellar investment career. While GSE investment may be thought of as an unusual opportunity, it is by no means a one-off. Ackman presents the GGP comparison to substantiate his belief that FNMA will have a similar price appreciation.
Ackman states that he talked to the head of NYSE listings with respect to a potential NYSE listing of GSE stock pre-recap/release, and was informed that the GSEs would satisfy all NYSE listing requirements, conditioned on the consent of FHFA as conservator to the listing. This NYSE listing of GSE stock pre-release/recap would increase the near term trading prices of GSE stock, due to the greater liquidity afforded by the listing. By virtue of the NYSE listing, there would be a greater universe of investors authorized to buy the stock, and the stock would be suitable for inclusion by relevant indexes, further increasing the supply of buyers. All participants to the GSE recap/release should be in favor of NYSE listing as soon as practicable. It was good to hear that the NYSE would be on board.
Ackman predicts that FHFA will adopt a 2.5% equity capital standard for the GSEs, as opposed to the current complicated standard of 8% of risk-adjusted assets with buffers, which equates to the >4% equity capital standard of the ERCF. Ackman doesn’t address how FHFA gets from the ERCF to a 2.5% capital standard, which might require APA notice and comment (about a one year process). Given that he assumes an end of 2026 IPO for Fannie Mae and end of 2027 IPO for Freddie Mac, the FHFA regulatory notice and comment process certainly could fit within that transactional schedule.
Ackman mentions that Keefe Brunette and Woods, an influential fianancial industry banker, also advocates for a 2.5 equity capital standard, which I had not noticed before.
Ackman also points out that the GSEs have a “hidden” additional $100B of capital in terms of claims paying ability, given the ability of cash flow from non-defaulted mortgages to fund the losses arising from defaulted mortgages in a recessionary environment. In developing the ERCF, no credit was given by FHFA to this claims-paying ability beyond equity capital.
Ackman addresses the backstop line of credit expected to be offered the GSEs by Treasury, by quoting a 25bps cost for the line (p. 71). In addition to the 2.5% equity capital that each GSE would have (>$100B), each GSE could maintain an additional $200B line of credit from Treasury at a cost of $500 million/year. To provide context, Fannie Mae is expected to earn net income of $18B/yr on a recurring basis. Without doubt, a GSE that maintains a 2.5% equity capital standard with an additional $200B line of credit would have a fortress-like capital position to maintain unquestionable financial safety.
Ackman applies a 10% discount to the intrinsic value of GSE common stock to arrive at his IPO common stock value. This looks to me like a IPO market discount without any Treasury overhang discount. I believe this underestimates the effect of the overhang of Treasury’s 79.9% stock position, which the market knows Treasury wants to sell down ASAP.
In terms of valuation and PE ratios, Ackman believes that the GSEs should be valued within the continuum of P&C insurers and regulated utilities (pps. 92-93). This yields a PE of 15X. The key here is for the GSE bankers to make the case in the IPO roadshows that Ackman is right and the GSEs should benefit from a higher PE than would be suggested by comparison to national banks. I used a 8X PE for my analysis.
Ackman addresses the likelihood that Treasury will cancel the SPS by noting that Treasury’s financial incentives align with this outcome, and failure to do so would create additional litigation which would frustrate the recap/release that Trump 47 wants to achieve.
I agree with both comments. Treasury will make more money selling its 79.9% common stock interest (through only warrant exercise) than a hypothetical 100% common stock interest after full conversion of the SPS.
This may sound counter-intuitive. However, it is never good financial and marketing policy to destroy the common stock holding base immediately prior to trying to sell into that common stock holding base. Moreover, the federal government would have to add some $7T in liabilities onto its balance sheet during the period after SPS conversion and before sell down below a 79.9% common stock holding.
This creates an unnecessary and unforced error for the US Treasuries markets, and if you watched Bessent in the hearing, this is precisely the kind of move a careful, thoughtful and cautious Treasury Secretary like Bessent would not make.
Trading in GSE Common Stock
You may have noticed that since late December 2024, when Ackman announced his forthcoming slide deck presentation and $>30/sh forecast price for GSE common stock, the GSE common stock has been trading like a meme stock, rising and falling 25% per day on hot momentum-style trading ebbs and flows.
Ignore daily moves, and instead focus on who Trump chooses for the new FHFA director [literally right after I first typed this, Trump nominated Bill Pulte as FHFA director], what Treasury Secretary says and does, and other Trump 47 news developments.
I will be right here deciphering as best as I can what I believe are the implications of these developments for a GSE investor.
* * * * *
navycmdr
5 hours ago
Latest FNMA Trades Delayed by 15 mins
Buy/Sell Ratio
Buy: 13MNeutral: 11MSell: 16M
Time Price Size Type B/S Bid Price Ask Price Total Volume Num Exch.
16:39:31 5.40 2,400 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,289,636 33637 nasd
16:01:01 5.40 50 Sell 5.40 5.41 41,287,236 33636 nasd
16:00:26 5.40 1,794 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,287,186 33635 nasd
16:00:26 5.41 5,000 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,285,392 33634 nasd
16:00:24 5.41 500 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,280,392 33633 nasd
16:00:24 5.41 250 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,279,892 33632 nasd
16:00:22 5.40 4,016 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,279,642 33631 nasd
16:00:21 5.40 1,000 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,275,626 33630 nasd
16:00:21 5.40 1,400 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,274,626 33629 nasd
16:00:12 5.40 169 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,273,226 33628 nasd
16:00:07 5.41 1,672 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,273,057 33627 nasd
15:59:59 5.40 743
krab
5 hours ago
Today's FNMA form t . Form T are trades that made it before the market closed, still been processed and form T generagted to complete transaction.
NOTE: FNMA closed at $5.40
Where's the big price change !!!
Time Price Size Type B/S Bid Price Ask Price Buy Ind. Total Volume Num Exch.
16:39:31 5.40 2,400 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,289,636 33637 nasd
16:01:01 5.40 50 Sell 5.40 5.41 41,287,236 33636 nasd
16:00:26 5.40 1,794 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,287,186 33635 nasd
16:00:26 5.41 5,000 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,285,392 33634 nasd
16:00:24 5.41 500 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,280,392 33633 nasd
16:00:24 5.41 250 form t Buy 5.40 5.41 41,279,892 33632 nasd
16:00:22 5.40 4,016 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,279,642 33631 nasd
16:00:21 5.40 1,000 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,275,626 33630 nasd
16:00:21 5.40 1,400 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,274,626 33629 nasd
16:00:12 5.40 169 form t Sell 5.40 5.41 41,273,226 33628 nasd
Rodney5
5 hours ago
Congressional Law
SEC. 304. SECONDARY MARKET OPERATION
Fee Limitation
Quote: “(f) PROHIBITION ON ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION OF FEE OR CHARGE BY UNITED STATES.—Except for fees paid pursuant to section 309(g) of this Act and assessments pursuant to section 1316 of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, no fee or charge may be assessed or collected by the United States (including any executive department, agency, or independent establishment of the United States) on or with regard to the purchase, acquisition, sale, pledge, issuance, guarantee, or redemption of any mortgage, asset, obligation, trust certificate of beneficial interest, or other security by the corporation. No provision of this subsection shall affect the purchase of any obligation by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.” End of Quote. Page 16
Only Federal Reserve Banks are authorized to be reimbursed of fees, (section 309).
SEC. 309. GENERAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
Federal Reserve Banks to Act as Fiscal Agents (Fannie Mae and GNMA)
Quote: “(g) DEPOSITARIES, CUSTODIANS, AND FISCAL AGENTS.—The Federal Reserve banks are authorized and directed to act as depositaries, custodians, and fiscal agents for each of the bodies corporate named in section 302(a)(2), for its own account or as fiduciary, and such banks shall be reimbursed for such services in such manner as may be agreed upon; and each of such bodies corporate may itself act in such capacities, for its own account or as fiduciary, and for the account of others.” End of Quote. Page 29
Link:
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION CHARTER ACT
As amended through July 25, 2019
link: https://www.fanniemae.com/sites/g/files/koqyhd191/files/migrated-files/resources/file/aboutus/pdf/fm-amended-charter.pdf