kthomp19
7 minutes ago
The SPS LP grows to $350B by next year. At that time, the SPS agreement gets re-written to cap the LP at that amount, and future earnings go to the GSEs without a corresponding dollar to LP. This finally ends the NWS.
I would suggest that the 10% divvy on the $350B LP can be reduced to a lower percentage, something more in line with an appropriate "guarantee fee" percentage. But the Charter Act prevents this. So let's go with zero percent dividend on the SPS. No need for Congress to change anything. Treasury holds 1M Senior shares, with just a LP and no dividend. This becomes their safety net - should they need to swoop in and liquidate the GSEs in the future, they hold $350B of LP. Warrants are not needed, and are left to expire.
Why on this green earth would Treasury choose to do this? It would run counter to everything they have done before. The LP ratchet itself is in place as a return consideration to Treasury for allowing FnF to keep their net worth.
At the very, very least Treasury would do what you say but exercise the warrants instead of canceling them.
Is this possible? Technically yes. But given all the evidence we have there is no reason to assign more than a token probability to it. What matters are numerical probability estimates, not just possibilities. Hope is not a strategy.
Another big flaw in this plan is that FnF would still need until 2040 to reach their required regulatory capital levels for release. With a 0% div rate Treasury would presumably be okay with the SPS reclassified to non-cumulative, which would fix the core and Tier 1 capital holes, but no form of preferred shares (either cumulative or non-cumulative) count towards CET1 capital, which is one of the capital requirements FnF must meet to be classified as "adequately capitalized" by HERA and is the requirement for exit set in the January 2021 letter agreement.
For FnF to meet the CET1 requirement before 2040, the SPS must be written down, converted to common, or some combination of both.
kthomp19
8 minutes ago
For someone who values semantics, you should note that JPS have a redemption value for when they get called. It happens to be the same as their liquidation preference, except for FNMFO.
They have a stated value, a redemption value, and a liquidation preference. They are all the same except that the stated value doesn't include accrued dividends (which I don't expect to ever matter). The FnF investor community calls this "par" even though it's a misnomer. I also call it "par" because it's much easier to type and effectively communicates what I mean.
I agree this could be the long term method that Treasury was hoping for, but it's problematic. First, because the dividends on the SPS are a huge windfall, likely to be in excess of $30B per year and not in line with what a "reasonable" funding commitment fee should be.
When I said that I expect the senior prefs to remain in existence I meant at a LP of $1B, not the >$300B LP they have today. The reduction in LP would happen alongside the conversion or writedown.
Second, because the Charter Act, which is the actual law - prevents a commitment fee from being charged. FHFA may be able to do what they want and ignore laws at the moment, but I don't think that will become status quo.
This is an opinion being presented as a fact. I highly doubt the lawyers who drafted the original SPSPAs would have included a commitment fee on the funding commitment if it were so obviously illegal. I trust their judgment far more than the armchair lawyers on this board.
kthomp19
8 minutes ago
You don't think it's likely that someone at Treasury would make a misleading statement to get what they want? Really?
I think that's less likely than the possibility that they were just telling the truth. Especially in the light of incentives: converting the SPS gives Treasury far more of what they want than writing them down does.
Or concrete evidence that writing down the LP is illegal, such as a statue, executive order, past ruling/case law, or official word from DOJ - not a recollection of a conversation from years prior, and from only one side of the conversation.
Once again you are demanding an extremely stringent standard of evidence from Calabria and Treasury while out of the other side of your mouth are giving blanket agreement to other posters without questioning them.
It is obvious by now that you just don't want to admit to the real evidence that is right in front of you: Treasury is far more likely to convert the SPS than write them down.
That means exactly zilch for determining the legality.
We have been over this already. It isn't about what really is legal or not, it's about what Treasury thinks is legal or not. Treasury will act based on what it believes is true.
Not words said in a conversation, meeting, phone call, video chat, or written memoir.
Calabria's account IS evidence. Not in a court of law sense, but this is not a court of law. What Calabria said directly pertains to the possibility of a SPS writedown and shows what Treasury's thoughts were on the matter at the time. In the absence of any further evidence, there is no reason to believe that it is likely that they have changed their mind.
No. First because Treasury is an entity and not a person. Second, what a person thinks is irrelevant unless they are in a position to act on bad information and nobody advises them of their error. Third, because anything that is not overtly illegal is by definition, legal. So barring any evidence that writing down the LP is illegal, it is by definition... Legal.
1) Meaningless semantics.
2) Nonsense. What Mnuchin thought was highly relevant. If he thought writing down the SPS was legal then he could have easily done so at any time. There would have been no need to make the equal conversion offer to the junior pref holders.
3) It's not nearly that cut and dried. Laws have interpretations: that's why courts exist. Just about every FnF investor ever thought the NWS was illegal but the Supreme Court disagreed.
kthomp19
8 minutes ago
The difference is that some are blinded by what they *think* will happen, ignoring other possibilities.
The difference is that some people, like me, actually put forth a number for things like the chances that Treasury converts (75%) or writes down (25%) the SPS. Most others just list possibilities without assigning numbers to them, which is completely useless when deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold at current prices.
But players are reluctant to relinquish their pick because that's the path they chose. The closer they get to the end, the more they think their pick is right.
That's just the endowment effect, a well-documented phenomenon.
Even I would sell some juniors to buy commons if the prices diverged enough. The FNMAS:FNMA ratio hit 4.0 today; if it goes much higher I probably will do just that.
Calculated from my cost basis. As the market fluctuates, I need to adjust my ratios as I accumulate. I haven't accumulated since common went back over 0.65. I've averaged down to roughly $1.00 per common, and less than $0.068 per $1 of JPS redemption value (mixed $25s & $50s).
The 6.8% figure depends pretty heavily on if you're buying the most liquid series (FNMAS, FMCKJ), the least liquid (usually the 5-letter ones starting with FMCC), or somewhere in between. They have all done well recently though.
Yes, and not knowing how much of each of those will actually happen, I've positioned myself for as many variations as I can.
You can only position yourself one way. It will be a function of the different possibilities and probabilities you assign to those variations.
If junior come out ahead of common, I win. If common realizes a higher multiple than JPS, I win more. I don't think Common nor JPS are getting wiped. I think there is upside in both.
I suppose that depends on what you define "winning" to be. If the juniors outperform the common you would lose relative to owning only juniors and no commons. But differences of opinion are what make a market.
I don't think either class gets totally wiped, but a SPS conversion would cause there to be little upside, and perhaps substantial downside, from current prices.
navycmdr
8 hours ago
Gov final Reply in Lamberth Case ...
+ plus the Seeking Alpha Article below:
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.160910/gov.uscourts.dcd.160910.436.0_1.pdf
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Fannie Mae Preferreds: A Safer Choice Than Common
Jul. 17, 2024 1:45 AM ET
...... Summary .......
--- Fannie Mae is likely to be recapitalized in the event of a Donald Trump victory.
--- The value of the common stock would be highly uncertain in a recap, but preferred issues
are likely to be redeemed or converted at face value.
--- The three most liquid preferred have compounded average annual returns above 100%
in the base scenario.
The last few weeks have seen renewed interest in the stocks of Fannie Mae (OTCQB:FNMA) and Freddie Mac (OTCQB:FMCC). The government-sponsored enterprises have been the Schrodinger's cat of the market, alive and dead at the same time, since the mortgage insurers were taken into conservatorship during the 2008 financial crisis.
SA analyst Chris DeMuth Jr. recently highlighted the GSEs as a good way to bet on a Donald Trump election victory because of the likelihood they would be recapitalized and released to private investors--turning the zombie cat into a roaring kitty.
Rather than echo his arguments, I will address the differences between common stock and the various preferred issues, focusing Fannie Mae since I've followed it for at least 25 years.
Common Has Negative Equity
The reason the preferreds carry less risk in the event of a successful recapitalization is found on the balance sheet. The GSEs were prohibited from accumulating equity by the Obama administration. Instead, all profits were subject to a net worth sweep, in which the Treasury Department confiscated profits in return for implicitly guaranteeing the GSEs' debt in case of failure.
As a result, Fannie showed negative common equity of over $130 billion until the Federal Housing Finance Agency reversed the policy under Trump's director, Mark Calabria. While Fannie is now retaining profits, common equity still stands nearly $58 billion underwater.
Balance sheet of Fannie Mae
Preferred equity, which is divided between the government and private investors, shows a positive balance of $139 billion. It is senior to the common. Under any normal reorganization plan, for common shareholders to get anything of value, preferred issues would have to be made whole first, either by being redeemed at par or by being converted to common. (Caveat: Nothing is normal about this situation.)
Calabria, an advocate of recapitalizing and releasing the GSEs, was replaced by the Biden administration, which has not reimposed the net worth sweep but has taken no steps toward release.
Calabria explained his views that the net worth sweep was illegal and release is legally necessary as well as desirable in a June recorded interview with Bloomberg. An especially relevant portion begins around 30:30 of the audio.
When people ask me, you know even in a Trump term, it's not going to be a 2025 exit. 2026, '27 is more likely."
Interviewer: "Do you feel that the 2028 warrants are a meaningful deadline?"
Calabria: "No. (Laughs). The reason it's really not is if you look at the total value pie for Treasury, it's a rounding error. The value really is in the senior preferreds..."
To understand what he's saying, it's important to know the government owns warrants to buy 79.9% of the common stock, which expire Sept. 7, 2028. The government also owns senior preferreds that were issued to support FNMA during and after the financial crisis. Investors own about $35 billion in junior preferreds. These are senior to the government's common warrants and thus cannot be diluted if they are issued, unlike the common stock.
So what Calabria says about the Treasury's shares would also hold true for those held by investors--most of the value is in the preferreds.
Release Scenarios
In 2020, the Congressional Budget Office released an analysis of three release scenarios, with optimistic, median, and pessimistic assumptions.
In some scenarios, the GSEs would raise enough from the common-stock sale to achieve three goals: meeting their capital requirements, redeeming their outstanding senior and junior preferred shares, and providing the Treasury with some value for the warrants it received from the GSEs. (Those warrants give the Treasury the right, though not the obligation, to buy common stock in the GSEs for a nominal price in the future.)
The middle of these scenarios called for redemption of approximately $35 billion in outstanding junior preferreds but ascribed a value of zero to $100 million to the common stock warrants owned by the government, which implies that the investor-owned common shares would be worth less than $20 million.
That's not to discount the possibility of a good return on the common. One possibility is that current shareholders will receive rights to buy new shares, which like many IPO's could be at a favorable price.
Also, if recent profits continue, common equity would turn positive around 2028, and existing shares would have a positive book value. And unlike the preferred, there's no theoretical limit to the value of the common.
However, the preferreds have to be taken care of before any recapitalization can take place, and thus offer a better chance of success. The common stock is more of a bet on a Trump victory and could be risky after the election even if he wins.
Which Preferreds To Buy?
Fannie Mae has 15 issues of preferreds that are trading over the counter, according to Quantum.
Most of them do not trade a lot of shares. By far the most liquid is FNMAS, with average daily volume of 471,000. Others with fair volume are FNMAT (63,000) and FNMFN (65,000).
Let's use FNMAS as an example. It recently closed at $5.55, or 22% of face value of $25. If investors purchased 1,000 shares for $5,550, and it was redeemed for face value in July 2026, they would receive $25,000, for a compound annual growth rate of 112%.
Other issues would give even greater gains, as there is a tradeoff between return and liquidity. FMMAT would have a compound annual growth rate of 127% under the same assumptions. FNMFN is at 147%. Some of the others are still higher, but stocks with low liquidity are not recommended for most investors.
If instead of redeeming the preferreds, the reorganization plan calls for resuming quarterly dividends, the calculations would be different. This does not appear likely, however, as 8.25% fixed coupon on FNMAT and the variable rates on FNMAS and FNMFN represent higher-cost capital than a huge, well-capitalized financial Fannie should need to pay. All of the securities are non-cumulative, so there will be no payment of arrears.
Risks
Re-election of President Biden likely would mean a continuation of the "dead" version of the cat and a tumble in both common and preferred prices. Even if Trump wins, there are various legal and regulatory obstacles to completion of recapitalization. A serious recession that freezes the mortgage or IPO market could make recapitalization untenable before the 2028 election.
Conclusion: FNMA should continue to do well through Election Day as long as there is anticipation of a Trump victory, but its value in a recapitalization plan is speculative. FNMAS, FNMAT, and FNMFN are recommended for investors who can afford to take risks.
This article was written by - Vlae Kershner